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In this paper I use the production function approach popularized by De Loecker et al. (2020) to analyze the
evolution of market power in Slovakia and some of its micro and macro implications. In contrast to other studies,
I calculate markups from both value added and sales and empirically test whether some of the global trends in
market power can be seen in Slovak firm level data as well. I find the that markups in Slovakia in fact declined
since 2010, both in terms of value added and sales. Although the decrease in sales markups is negligible, the
value added aggregate markup declined by 25% from 2.35 in 2012 to 1.78 in 2018. Value added markups tend
to be higher for relatively value-added larger firms and they are also higher in larger sectors. Smaller firms (size
indicated by number of employees) tend to have higher markups. It seems that a typical high markup firm is
relatively small (in terms of number of employees) but produces relatively larger output. Correlations between
markups and various measures of profitability show that there is indeed a relationship between markups and
market power. Markups strongly correlate with profits and they do not significantly react to changes in costs.
Markups in Slovakia evolve in excess of marginal costs. Slovak firm data shows that markups are also inversely
associated to labor shares. Correlation is statistically strong and empirically well established.
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Studying market power and its economic implications has become a fruitful area for contemporary economic
research. Healthy competition among firms is an essential determinant of a well-functioning economy. It ensures
that prices reflect costs and motivates firms to constantly innovate which in turn improves consumer welfare
and drives economic growth. On the other hand, barriers to entry, various market distortions and monopoly
power allow firms to charge higher than optimal prices thus reducing welfare which is harmful to economic
development.
In this paper I follow the most up-to-date literature on markups and market power and apply the production
function markup estimation to Slovak firm level data. I empirically verify some of the trends seen mainly in
the U.S. and discuss the evolution of market power in a small open economy. I also empirically investigate
whether the claims of inverse size-markup and positive profit-markup relation can be found in data. So far
the studies analyzing trends in market power came from the U.S. and little is known about this issue in other
countries. There are some studies using international data and/or cross-country comparison but none provides
comprehensive understanding of a country specific evolution of market power from firm level data.. I focus
on Slovakia because the firm data availability is excellent, and to my knowledge, there is no other study that
applies the methodology from De Loecker et al. (2020) to a European economy in such detail. Also, this is
a first comprehensive study analyzing market power in Slovakia and in the CEE region from firm level data.
Firstly, I study the evolution of firm markups in the last decade and discuss their distribution. I then analyze
their relation to various firm characteristics, mainly firm size, profitability and labor share. I also discuss how
the results depend on the choice of variable inputs and production function specification.
Looking at the markup evolution I find the that markups in Slovakia in fact declined since 2010, both in
terms of value added and sales. Although the decrease in sales markups is negligible, the value added aggregate
markup declined by 25% from 2.35 in 2012 to 1.78 in 2018. Value added markups tend to be higher for relatively
value-added larger firms and they are also higher in larger sectors. Smaller firms (size indicated by number of
employees) tend to have higher markups, but there are some large firms with higher markups that drive the
evolution of aggregate markup. Markup decomposition shows (both for sales and value added markups) that
at the firm level the within effect is the main driver of the aggregate markup movements and the change in
markups occurs within and between sectors at the same time. It seems that a typical high markup firm is
relatively small (in terms of number of employees) but produces relatively larger output.
Correlations between markups and various various measures of profitability show that there is indeed a
relationship between markups and market power. Markups strongly correlate with profits and they do not react
significantly to changes in costs. Markups in Slovakia evolve in excess of marginal costs. Firm data shows
that markups are also inversely associated to labor shares. Correlation is statistically strong and empirically
well established. These finding are well in line with De Loecker et al. (2020). On the other hand, market
power measured through firms’ market shares does not systematically correlate with markups. The results
using market shares as explanatory variable are statistically inconsistent and require further understanding.
Decreasing aggregate markup crudely correlates with increasing share of labor’s income in GDP thus giving
merit to certain macroeconomic implications of market power.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: next section reviews the literature on market power and
its economic implications, in Section 3 I introduce markup derivation via the production function approach
and in Section 4 I briefly discuss data quality and present some summary statistics. Section 5 deals with the
baseline results and presents the evolution of market power from the value added specification of markups. In
Robustness checks I calculate markups from sales and analyze the relation between markups and labor shares
at the firm level. In section 7 I conclude the paper and emphasise the main findings.
2 Literature review
Recent period has seen a growing number of studies dedicated to analyzing market power and its various macroe-
conomic impacts. Together with a diffusion of high quality firm-level data many studies focused on estimating
firm-level markups and concentration indices, their evolution and their effect on aggregate employment, wages
and labor share.
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De Loecker et al. (2020), using Compustat and Census data, analyze in great detail the evolution of
aggregate and firm markups and document the presence of rising market power in the U.S. starting from 1980s.
Similarly as Autor et al. (2020)) they find the increase in markups is driven mainly by the upper tail of the
markup distribution while median markups remain unchanged. In addition to the fattening upper tail of the
markup distribution, there is reallocation of market share from low to high markup firms. They also discuss
some macroeconomic implications of rising mark ups and relate the results to declining labor and capital shares
as well as to the decrease in labor market dynamism.
Autor et al. (2020) link the fall of labor’s share of GDP in the United States to the phenomenon of the
so called superstar firms. According to the authors, globalization and technological changes push sales towards
the most productive firms in each industry thus product market concentration will rise as industries become
increasingly dominated by superstar firms. Since these firms have high markups and a low labor shares of value
added and sales, a reallocation of output toward superstar firms depresses the aggregate labor share. They
find that in industries where concentration has risen the most, labor shares declined significantly. This effect
is mainly driven by reallocation of economic to high productive firms. Overall they document that in past
decades U.S. sectors have become much more concentrated and some of the decline in labor share through rising
concentration might be seen in Europe as well.
From the European perspective, McAdam et al. (2019) finds that concentration and markups are largely
stable in the Euro Area. In the study the authors find that the aggregate euro area markup has been fairly
stable, varying around the value of 10-15% and has even declined marginally since late 1990s. According to
the results, these developments are driven largely by manufacturing and may be attributed to the stability of
market power and to the impact of trade and monetary integration in the Euro Area. Contrary to the U.S. case,
there are industries and firms that have high (and rising) markups but such firms are not those with particularly
high market shares; thus they do not impart a trend in the aggregate markup in the Euro Area.
Other papers document negative impact of rise in market power on employment and wages. Benmelech
et al. (2018) using US Census data of American manufacturing firms in the period of 1977-2009 show that
local-level employer concentration increased over time and is negatively related to wages. According to their
estimates the negative relation between labor market concentration and wages is stronger when unionization
rates are low and the link between productivity growth and wage growth is stronger when labor markets are
less concentrated. Their results emphasize the role of local-level labor market monopsonies in influencing firm
wage-setting behavior and state that the results can explain some of the stagnation of wages in the United
States over the past several decades. Qiu & Sojourner (2019) find also similar results.
Jarosch et al. (2019) build a model where firm size is a source labor market power. In Austrian micro-data,
the authors find that granular market power depresses wages by about ten percent and can explain 40 percent
of the observed decline in the labor share from 1997 to 2015. According to the authors, mergers decrease
competition for workers and reduce wages even at non-merging firms.
Bridging both product and labor marker imperfection Dobbelaere et al. (2013) show that both product
and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and
their corresponding shares in revenue. The authors then classify industries into different regimes based on
product market (markup) and labor market imperfections that can be characterized by a so called joint market
imperfections parameter. For each of the predominant regimes in each country, they then investigate industry
differences in the estimated product and labor market imperfections and scale economies.
Another branch of literature focuses on the relationship between markups and firm size. Although the
literature is scarcer, Atkin et al. (2015) show that firm size is positively related do mark ups. Using firm level
data of 135 soccer-ball manufacturers in Pakistan they show that elasticity of firm size to markups increases with
higher quality products, where in turn larger firm size is associated with higher quality production. According
to the authors, average markups increase with firm size because larger firms produce disproportionately more
high-quality balls, and within each type of ball obtain higher markups. On the other hand, in the Appendix
6 of De Loecker et al. (2020) the authors document that there is a negative relationship between markups
and firm size (in terms of employment). These contradicting results suggest non-monotonicity in markup-size
relationship. In fact, Diéz et al. (2019) using international ORBIS firm level data find non-monotonicity, but
positive relationship between firm size and markups is found only for the highest percentile of firms in firm
sales distribution. Although non-monotonicity is found for industry firm sales share, the additional results
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indicate that there is indeed negative correlation between between firm size measured in number of employees
and markups.
3 Markup derivation
To precisely estimate markups one would need to exactly know firm level or even product level individual prices
and marginal costs. Since firm or product level prices are a feature of very few databases and marginal costs
are not trivial to estimate, researchers rely on various assumptions on economic behaviour of firms in order to
produce plausible estimates of firm level markups. In general, there exists three distinct approaches to calculate
markups. First approach relies on accounting standards, where in the case of Slovak accounting legal framework,
commercial markups are calculated as a difference between sales and intermediate inputs, specifically, between
sold and purchased merchandise. Although this approach is straightforward and very easy to implement, it
abstracts from other types of variable costs and sales items and does not provide economically meaningful
insights into firm pricing behaviour.
The second approach draws from the Industrial Organization literature and builds on the specification of
a demand system. It uses information and assumptions on how firms compete which then under first order
conditions delivers optimal firm pricing and desired demand elasticities. Similarly as in De Loecker et al. (2020)
this approach does not fit this study since the data does not include information on product prices and quantities
and I do not consider appropriate to impose one demand system for all the products under consideration or for
all sectors.
The third approach, used in this paper, stems from cost minimizing behaviour. In order to estimate firm
level markups I rely on approach developed by Hall (1988) and recently applied by De Loecker & Warzynski
(2012) or De Loecker et al. (2020). This method uses information from firm’s financial statements, and does
not require any assumptions on demand and how firms compete. Instead, markups are obtained by exploiting
cost minimization of variable inputs in production. This approach requires, however, an explicit treatment of
the production function to obtain the output elasticity of at least one variable input of production.1
3.1 Production function approach
Markup is defined as a wedge between price and marginal cost and can be interpreted as as measure of market
power. Mathematically markups are defined as the ratio of price to marginal cost:
(1) µ ≡ P
c
Since prices and marginal costs are not observable in the firm level data I use value added, sales, expenditure
on variable inputs and output elasticities to recover the measure of markups. For this purpose I follow De Loecker
et al. (2020) and calculate markups from static first order conditions of cost minimization. Consider and economy
with N firms, indexed by i = 1,..., N . Firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity Ait and technology Fit
is sector specific. In each period t firms minimize the contemporaneous cost of production given the production
function:
(2) Qit = Fit(Ait,Ki,t−1, Lit),
where Ki,t−1, Lit denote net capital stock and labor, respectively. Variable input Lit adjust perfectly while
capital stock Kit faces adjustment frictions. In terms of cost minimization I consider the Lagrangian objective
function:
(3) Λ(Kit, Lit, λit) = witLit + ritKi,t−1 − λit(F (·)−Qit),
1De Loecker et al. (2020)
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where wit, rit denote input factor prices, F (·) is the technology specified in equation (2), Qit is a scalar
and λit is the Lagrange multiplier. I assume that firms are price takers on input factor market. The first order
condition with respect to the variable input Lit is:




Multiplying all terms in equation (4) by LitQit and rearranging terms yields an expression for the output












Since the Lagrangian multiplier can be interpreted as a measure of marginal cost and therefore from
definition (1) we have µ = Pλ , where P is the output price. Substituting marginal cost for the markup to price
ratio, I obtain a simple expression for the markup:






Therefore in order to estimate the firm markup one needs to know the output elasticity θit and the share
of the variable input in total sales. An important feature of the markup derivation is to correctly estimate the
output elasticities. Value added and personnel costs are available from the data. Therefore in order to estimate
output elasticities I use control function approach developed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003).
3.2 Production function estimation
In production function literature the major obstacle for consistent estimation is correlation between unobserved
productivity shocks and input levels. As Petrin et al. (2004) state, profit-maximizing firms respond to positive
productivity shocks by expanding output, which requires additional inputs. Negative shocks lead firms to pare
back output, decreasing their input usage. When true, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of production
functions are biased and, by implication, lead to biased estimates of productivity and output elasticities. Various
methods have been proposed to tackle such simultaneity issue and, according to these approaches, it is possible
to group them in three families: Fixed Effects (FE), Instrumental Variables (IV) and Control Function (CF).2
In this paper I use the CF approach and rely on intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity
shocks.3
Similarly as in the section above, I work with two-factor, but log-linear Cobb-Douglass production function
specification (capital and labor). I apply the Levinsohn-Petrin approach to a robust panel of more than 380
thousand firm-year observations covering the period of 2014–2018 and estimate output elasticities for each firm.
To overcome the productivity shock endogeneity problem in CF estimations I use intermediate inputs as the
proxy variable. To capture differences in sectoral technologies, CF regressions are performed for each 3-digit
sector separately and the production function is given by:4
(7) (PsitQsit) = θ1Capitalsi,t−1 + θ2Laborsit + τst + ωsit + εsit
2Mollisi & Rovigatti (2017)
3The benefits of using Levinsohn-Petrin approach are described in Petrin et al. (2004).
4Performing production function estimation sector by sector allows me to estimate sector specific output elasticities and distin-
guish among different technologies used by firms in different sectors.
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where PsitQsit represents log of firm value added, Capitalsi,t−1 stands for log of sum of net fixed and
intangible assets from the previous year and laborsit stands for log of number of employees.
5 I also incorporate
year fixed effects τst. By incorporating year fixed effects I capture any common trends that may affect firms
in a given sector. If these common trends are variations in input and output prices, it is possible to, at least
partly, alleviate the concerns that price level movements confounds the estimates of θit. In general, year fixed
effects could capture some evolution in prices, thus partly (but not fully) alleviate the problem of price bias
in productivity estimation. Term εsit is the idiosyncratic error and the term ωsit represents the unobserved
productivity. Subscripts s, i, t stand for sector, firm and year, respectively. Three remarks must be made here.
Firstly, for capital I use the sum of net fixed and intangible assets. Secondly, simple metric of number of
employees does not have to properly differentiate between quality of human capital. Some studies, e.g. Hsieh
& Klenow (2009), use personnel costs rather than number of employees. By doing so they crudely control for
differences in worker skills and education. Firms operating with higher share of highly educated individuals
should be more productive and this fact is usually reflected in more expensive labor input. Although these
concerns are valid, using personnel costs instead of number of employees would provide implausible low levels
of labor output elasticities. To stay in line with the literature and common approaches I use the number of
employees as a baseline labor indicator. Intermediate inputs are calculated as the sum of purchased merchandise,
goods and services, materials and energy costs. Output elasticities estimated from the CF regressions are then
applied to all firms in their respective 3-digit sector for the period of 2010-2018.
4 Data description
In order to evaluate the evolution of markups and market power in Slovakia I use a detailed firm level database
compiled from four key sources which are the Registry of Financial Statements,6 the Statistical Office of the
Slovak Republic, and a private company, Finstat s.r.o..7 The fourth source is the Social Insurance Company
from which I draw firm level data on employment (full time and part-time employees) and average firm wages.
Employment and wage data is available for the years 2014 to 2018. I match firms from all databases based on
a unique firm identifier.
Although the data starts in 2010, it was only compulsory for firms to publish data in the Registry from
2013 onward. Therefore the data for the period between 2010 and 2012 is to be considered as a subsample of
the Slovak firm population. On average, the unbalanced panel of firms consists of of 182 thousands observations
per year (1.6 million in total) over the period of 2010 to 2018 and covers all sectors of the economy.
For the purpose of markup calculation I use data on sales, value added, intermediate consumption, capital
(net fixed and intangible assets), personnel costs and number of employees in order estimate firm production
function and output elasticities of variable inputs. As will be reported later in the following sections I then use
these elasticities to calculate firm markups stemming from the first order minimization conditions.
To proceed with the analysis further, I start by cleaning the database. I drop missing and negative
observations from the data. Public sector, finance and real estate companies are also excluded. In order to not
have the analysis sensitive to outliers I trim the top and bottom 1 percent of a ratio of value added to personnel
costs and drop firms with less than 2 employees.8 To estimate the production function I drop sectors with less
than 100 observations, where sectors are defined at 3-digit NACE Rev. 2 level. I also drop firms that uploaded
their financial statements for the period covering more than 457 days and less than 273 days, respectively. In
the end I am left with total number of 380 thousand observations distributed across all main sectors of the
Slovak economy for the period of 2010 to 2018.
Table 1 presents some elementary summary statistics which are divided in three 4-year windows. As it
5Aggregate firm employment is a sum of full-time and part-time employees, where part-time employees are assigned 50% weight.
Since capital stock is reported in the financial statement as of end-of-the-period, I use its lag to properly estimate the effect of
capital on production taking into account capital stock adjustment frictions.
6The Registry is administered by the Financial Administration of the Slovak Republic where firms upload entire balance sheets
and income statements for public disclosure.
7However, not all firms have their data freely accessible. Some firms and mainly the self-employed do not have their balance
sheets and income statements publicly available. Since the self-employed are not of interest and only a minimum of firms have their
data unavailable, I do not consider this to be an issue of great importance.
8In the Robustness check section I follow the same data cleaning procedures but instead of the value added to personnel costs
ratio I drop top and bottom 1 percent of a ratio of sales to variables costs (sum of personnel costs and intermediate consumption).
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can be seen, unweighted average of firm value added markups oscillates around 1.4 - 1.5 and increased since
2010. Even after dropping outliers, markups among Slovak firms are very heterogeneous indicated by large
dispersion between the minimum and maximal values. The unweighted mean of around 1.5 is in line with other
studies such as Diéz et al. (2019) or De Loecker et al. (2020). The median markup reaches 1.12 in 2018. I also
report labor shares in relation to sales and value added. In the post-crisis period average labor share in relation
to sales (personnel costs divided by sales) increased from 25% to 30% but average labor share in value added
decreased from 97% to 86% in 2018. Slovak firms are on average very small with around 20 employees but are
characterized by a substantial size heterogeneity. I believe that these data features will provide valuable insights
into relationships between market power, employment and labor shares.
Table 1: Selected summary statistics
2010
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Markup 27,120 1.422 1.463 0.00400 25.97
Labor share (output) 27,090 0.246 0.725 0.000156 79.86
Labor share (VA) 27,120 0.974 1.678 0.0390 107.5
2014
Employment 46,195 22.11 152.6 2 14,259
Markup 46,195 1.511 1.483 0.0149 25.93
Labor share (output) 46,171 0.235 1.022 0.000295 153.0
Labor share (VA) 46,195 0.905 1.129 0.0205 23.59
VA per worker 46,195 17,813 26,855 3 1.484e+06
Output per worker 46,195 116,348 513,959 0 5.648e+07
Capital intensity 46,195 24,868 169,417 0 2.568e+07
2018
Employment 57,372 19.81 132.5 2 14,583
Markup 57,372 1.536 1.546 0.0125 23.69
Labor share (output) 57,355 0.300 13.29 0.000436 3,180
Labor share (VA) 57,372 0.862 0.968 0.0200 29.27
VA per worker 57,372 19,873 27,799 16.25 1.334e+06
Output per worker 57,372 116,488 489,525 0 4.833e+07
Capital intensity 57,372 25,061 152,560 0 1.972e+07
5 Results
In this section I report the baseline results regarding the evolution of markups and market power in Slovakia. I
start by computing aggregate markup for the whole economy and analyze its evolution.9 Later in the paper I will
provide decomposition of the aggregate markup change to show what are the main forces behind its evolution.
Distribution of markups will also be of interest. In the second part I use estimated markups and relate them
to various firm characteristics and investigate whether movements in markups affect market power. Since the
main results deal with markups calculated only from value added, in the Robustness checks section I replace
value added with sales and add intermediate consumption as a third factor into the production function. I will
then discuss the effect of markups on firm labor shares.
9I start by analyzing markups calculated from the value added specification. Later in the Robustness check section I evaluate
the evolution of markups from the standard gross output (sales) specification.
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5.1 Evolution of the aggregate markup
To present the results for the evolution of the aggregate (weighted) markup I calculate firm markups according
to the equation (6) for every year in the dataset and weight them by their respective value added share in
total economy. Results are presented in Figure 1. After the Great Financial Crisis and austerity induced
GDP growth slowdown from 2009 to 2012 the aggregate markup declined by 25% from 2.35 in 2012 to 1.78 in
2018. What is very interesting is that the decrease in the aggregate markup is driven solely by the decline of
markups in services and utilities while in all other sectors markups are largely stable (Figure 2).10 Between
2010 and 2018 markups in services declined by 35% and in utilities by 18% and the decrease was driven mainly
by telecommunication, casinos and IT services. Since 2016 markups in services stabilized and are the highest
within the whole economy. In 2018, out of top 10 NACE 2-digit sub-sectors in markup distribution, were 8 from
services (mainly ICT sectors, casinos and legal and administrative services).
Figure 1: Aggregate economy-wide markup
Note: Weighted average markup equals the value-added-share-weighted average of firm level markups. Simple average is
calculated as an arithmetic mean of individual firm markups.
Figure 2: Sectoral markups
Note: Sectoral markup equals the value-added-share-weighted average of firm level markups. Weights are calculated as
a ratio of firm value added in total sector value added.
The difference between the weighted and unweighted markup in the Figure 1 indicates that, on aggregate,
larger firms (in terms of value added) have higher markups. Empirically, these results are well in line with
10Sectoral markups are calculated analogically to aggregate markup but firm value added shares are computed for each sector
separately.
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De Loecker et al. (2020) but contradict the results found in Diéz et al. (2019). The fact that the blue line
(weighted markup) is always above the black line (unweighted average) indicates that relatively larger firms
do have higher markups. Diéz et al. (2019) using the Orbis database find opposite results. In their case
the explanation is that small firms operate in niche markets facing demands that allow them to charge high
markups.11 According to my results, this in not the case for Slovak firm level data. If markups are allowed to be
treated as distortions similarly to Hsieh & Klenow (2009) then they might distort firm size but not necessarily
from the output side. Later in the paper I investigate whether markups are inversely related to firm size from
the input size (employment) and discuss their exogeneity. Mathematically the relationship between relative firm





sitµit = µt +
∑
i
(sit − st)(µit − µt),
where µt is the value-added-weighted average markup; sit is the share of firm i’s value added (PitQit) in
total value added in the economy (Vt =
∑
i PitQit); µt is the unweighted average of markups and the second term
shows the covariance between relative firm size sit and firm markup µit. Since in the Figure 1 the unweighted
markup (black line) is always below the weighted markup (blue line) then the covariance is positive implying
that on aggregate level there is a positive relationship between a firm’s value added share and its markup.
Similar decomposition can be done at the sectoral level as well. Following De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017)
I can decompose the evolution of the aggregate markup as follows:
(9) µt = µst +
∑
s
(sst − sst)(µst − µst),
where µst is the unweighted average of (weighted) markup across industries, and the last term is the
covariance between market share and markups at the industry (sectoral) level. Variables sst and µst represent
the sector’s value added weight in the total economy and the sectoral weighted markup, respectively.12
Figure 3: Evolution of markups: Aggregate weighted vs. mean sectoral markups
Note: Mean sectoral markups calculated as a simple unweighted average of sectoral markups.
Figure 3 documents the decomposition from the equation (9). The difference between the average of
3-digit sectoral markups (black line) and the aggregate weighted markup (blue line) is proportional to the
covariance between the industry share of sales in the entire economy and the average weighted markup in that
11Diéz et al. (2019) and Holmes & Stevens (2014)
12See De Loecker & Eeckhout (2017) equations (11) and (12).
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industry. During the whole period from 2010 to 2018 mean sectoral markups are always below the weighted
aggregate markup indicating that not only relatively larger firms but also larger sectors have higher markups.
Although markups have markedly declined in the last decade, they are consistently larger for large firms and
large industries.
Diéz et al. (2019) made an important point regarding the evolution of the aggregate markup. In their
paper they showed that large firms are the main drivers of markup evolution.13 Similarly as in their Orbis
database, Slovak firms are very heterogeneous both in terms of markups and other firm characteristics. Taking
the substantial heterogeneity of Slovak firm characteristics into account, it is clear to see that the markup time
series variation is driven mainly by firms with relatively large value added (Figure 4, left panel). Surprisingly,
dividing firms into markup quartiles shows that average markups for firms in 1st to 3rd quartile remain stable
and do not experience any sizeable variation during the period in question. Also in Diéz et al. (2019) it was the
firms with very high markups that experienced sizeable markup increases. In the Slovak data I find opposite
developments. As Figure 4 shows, the decline in the aggregate markup was mainly driven by decreasing markups
of relatively large and high-markup firms.
Figure 4: Evolution of markups by quartiles
Note: Markups calculated as a weighted average of firm level markups in each quartile. Left panel (quartiles by value
added), right panel (quartiles by markup).
Distribution of markups in Slovakia over time is relatively stable and does not change very much. In the
right panel of Figure 5 there is a slight rightward movement of the markup distribution and the right tail is
slightly longer and thicker. These movements indicate the increase of number of firms with very high markups.
Left panel shows the comparison of markup distributions for small (less than 50 employees) and large (more
than 50 employees) firms in 2018. Larger firms have markups oscillating around the value of 1 and are less
dispersed. For smaller firms the right tail is thicker and markups experience greater variation. These results
are partly in line with Diéz et al. (2019) and De Loecker et al. (2020) who show that markups are negatively
correlated with firm size. But as is the case in this paper, size must be measured in number of employees and
not as relative output size in order to reach such conclusion.
13Firm size in their study is defined as sales share within the economy or respective sector.
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Figure 5: Kernel density distribution of firm markups
Quartile decomposition shown in the Figure 4 indicates that there are some relatively large firms (in terms
of value added) that act as key drivers in the aggregate markup evolution. Density distributions from the Figure
5 show that there was a rightward, although very small, movement of the markup distribution. To investigate
whether the decrease in the aggregate markup is driven by a few firms in the top/bottom of the distribution,
as it is for example in De Loecker et al. (2020), I further decompose the decrease in the aggregate weighted
markup into the component that is due to the change in the markup itself, and the component that is due to
the reallocation of economic activity towards high/low markup firms. I again follow De Loecker et al. (2020)

















where µ̃it = µi,t−1 − µt and ˜µi,t−1 = µi,t−1 − µt−1. The first term measures the average change that is
merely due to a change in the markup, while keeping the market shares unchanged from last period (the within
effect). The second and third term jointly measure the effect of reallocation. The second term represents the
change that is due to an increase in market share while keeping the markup fixed. If this term is increasing, it
captures the fact that firms with higher markups now have a higher market share and hence there is an increase
in the weight of the high markup firms. The third term (the cross term effect) measures the joint change in
markups and market share. The last two terms measure the effect of entry and exit on markups. This captures
the change in the composition of firms in the market meaning that if entering firms have on average higher
markups than this term will be positive. However, it must be noted that entry and exit of firms in the data
include both real market entry and exit and the fact that some firms enter and exit the database.
The results from the decomposition (10) are presented in the Figure 6. The three lines each represent a
hypothetical exercise where each component from (10) is separately added to the level of the initial aggregate
markup in 2010. The firm-level decomposition shows that the decrease in the aggregate markup is driven for the
most part by the within effect. This suggests that markups declined across the board for most firms. Net entry
virtually does not contribute to the change in the weighted markup although the reallocation effect is positive,
the within effect always dominates. These results show that the decline in markups in Slovakia is widespread
and stems from change in markups at the firm level.
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Figure 6: Change in aggregate markup - firm-level decomposition
Lastly, in contrast with the firm level decomposition, I can also decompose the change in he aggregate
markup at the sectoral level. This decompositon is very similar to the one in equation (10) but since the the
number of sectors is fixed it only has three terms - the within effect, the between effect and the cross term effect











Figure 7 shows the results of the sectoral decomposition from the equation (11). The three lines each
again represent a hypothetical exercise where each component from (11) is separately added to the level of the
initial aggregate markup in 2010. The sectoral decomposition shows, that for the most part, it is the within
and between effect that drive the evolution of the aggregate markup. From the Figure 2 it is clear to see
that the decline is present mainly in the service and utility sector. The within effect development is in line
with the firm-level evidence from (10) but it is also the declining share of large sectors in the economy that
compliments the decrease in the markup. The results from the sectoral decomposition are similar to the ones
found in De Loecker et al. (2020) where the within effect also dominates but in Slovak firm level data I did not
find convincing evidence to support the reallocation thesis of superstar firms.
Figure 7: Change in aggregate markup - sectoral decomposition
In sum, I showed that the aggregate value added markup decreased over the past years and the decrease
came mainly from the utility and service sector. Markups tended to be higher for relatively value-added-weighted
larger firms and they are also higher in larger sectors. Smaller firms (size indicated by number of employees)
tend to have higher markups, but there are some large firms with higher markups that drive the evolution of
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aggregate markup. Markup decomposition shows that at the firm level the within effect is the main driver of
aggregate markup movements and the change in markups occurs within and between sectors at the same time.
5.2 Markups and firm size
Equation (6) shows that under cost minimization, markups are negatively related to the amount and costs
of variable inputs. If the wedge between price and marginal costs is large and positive, firms do not need
to increase the amount of labor and intermediate inputs to scale up production and increase profits. Under
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous markups, two identical firms in terms of profit margin (profits
divided by sales) may have different sizes depending on market power. Under monopolistic competition with
homogeneous markups and with standard Dixit-Stiglitz CES demand, firms differ in size through differences
in their productivity. One such case is undistorted economy as in Hsieh & Klenow (2009). Allowing for
heterogeneous markups introduces a new type of wedge that affects firm size as well. A firm with larger markup
will employ fewer workers and use less intermediate inputs but it can have the same profit margin as a larger
firm with smaller markup. Higher markups permit firms to maximize profits using smaller amount of inputs
through charging higher prices. Market power thus creates substantial welfare loses.
In order to empirically investigate the relationship between markups and firm characteristics such as firm
size and labor share I run rich set of fixed effects regressions. In the baseline regressions I am agnostic about
the exogeneity of markups. One may argue that market structure, other competing firms and internal firm
decisions (other than the choice of optimal amount of variable inputs) determine markups. Marketing strategy,
quality improvements or change in consumer preferences are also more likely to influence price policy rather
than the amount of labor and intermediate inputs. Also bundle pricing, taxes and consumer income influence
demand therefore affect output prices. Given the large number of other potential factors influencing the price
of goods and services sold, thus markup as well, some may find the exogeneity assumption amply convincing.
Also it is worth mentioning that neither De Loecker et al. (2020) nor Diéz et al. (2019) discuss the exogeneity of
markups with respect to firm size and profits. Diéz et al. (2019) treat the firm size (both in number of employees
or market share) as an explanatory variable whereas in De Loecker et al. (2020) the markup is treated as the
explanatory variable in the labor share and market power regressions. Diéz et al. (2018) discuss the endogeneity
of markups with respect to firm investment rate and instrument the markup of the i-th firm with the median
markup of the other firms in the same subsector (excluding the i-th firm). In Atkin et al. (2015) authors also
regress markups on employment finding positive relationship between the firm size and markups. However, this
positive correlation, as argued by the authors, correlates with the fact that larger firms produce higher quality
products which is thus reflected in higher prices. Therefore it might not be the firm size but rather than the
product quality improvements that drive the size of markups. For now I follow De Loecker et al. (2020), Diéz
et al. (2019) and Atkin et al. (2015) and treat the RHS and LHS variables in regressions as they do. Treating
the firm size as the explanatory variable also stems from the first order conditions.
Markup decompositions and density distributions suggest that there is a negative correlation between firm
size (mainly in terms of employment) and markups. To empirically confirm this suggestive evidence I run
firm size regressions similar to Diéz et al. (2019) and Atkin et al. (2015). Slovak firm level data shows that, on
average, lower markups are indeed associated with larger firms. Table 2 presents the results. In all specifications
the coefficients on the elasticity of firm employment w.r.t markups is negative and statistically significant. It
indicates that 1 % increase in the firm employment leads to 0.26% to 0.5% decline in the markup and the relation
is not linear which is indicated by the statistically significant quadratic term. What is interesting is that both
labor productivity and TFP are positively related to markups, more productive firms have higher markups. For
example, under monopolistic competition models with heterogeneous firms, an increase in TFP would decrease
marginal costs which in turn would permit firms increase markups without increasing prices. Unfortunately,
the data does not contain information on firm specific prices for goods and services sold or marginal costs.
Therefore, I cannot plausibly verify whether more productive firms have lower markups as a result of decreasing
marginal costs or pass their productivity premia directly to production or quality improvements with little or
no change for demand for variable inputs.
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Table 2: Value added markups and firm size
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Markup Markup Markup
Employment -0.524*** -0.512*** -0.264***
(0.0269) (0.0298) (0.0227)
Employment sq. 0.0596*** 0.0450*** 0.0312***
(0.00455) (0.00439) (0.00355)






Constant 0.923*** -6.021*** -6.121***
(0.0336) (0.158) (0.145)
Observations 241,835 188,845 241,827
R-squared 0.734 0.908 0.891
Firm FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.0208 0.617 0.599
Adj. R-sq. 0.641 0.876 0.853
Legal form YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
5.3 Markups, profitability and market power
As rightfully mentioned in De Loecker et al. (2020) the documented rise in markups in the U.S. does not
necessarily imply that firms have more market power, and therefore higher economic profits. According to
the authors, increasing markups can come from a variety of reasons that are not associated with a decline in
aggregate welfare. For example, a decrease in marginal costs, an increase in fixed costs or innovation, an increase
in demand or in its elasticity, a change in the market structure, new product varieties, all lead to increasing
markups without necessarily implying higher prices or profits. But with the absence of detailed price-level data
I, similarly to the other studies, must resort to the alternative indicators of market power. Following Cooper &
Ejarque (2003) who argue that in their model profitability is associated with market power, I use profit margins
and profit rates as proxy measures for such developments. I also investigate whether sectoral firm sales shares
are correlated with markups to provide a clearer picture on the association of markups and market power.
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Figure 8: Profitability and the aggregate markup
Note: The aggregate profit margin calculated as a sales weighted average of individual firm profit margins. The aggregate
profit rate uses net total assets as weights. Gross profits before taxes. The profit rate and the profit margin on the left
axis. The aggregate value added markup on the right axis.
Figure 8 presents the evolution of the aggregate profitability and the aggregate markup. Both the profit
margin (profits divided by sales) and the profit rate (profits divided by total net assets) roughly copy movements
in the aggregate markup (mainly from 2014 onward when the data starts to cover all firms). The unweighted
average (not reported) is strongly negative implying that both profit rates and margins are positive mainly
for relatively large firms. Therefore as stated in the Section 5.1, small firms do have higher markups but the
evolution of the aggregate markup and, in this case, (positive) profitability is in the most part driven by large
firms (large both in terms of sales and assets).
I also find positive relationship between markups and profitability at the firm level. No matter whether
I choose profit margin, profit rate or EBITDA margin (EBITDA divided by sales) the positive correlation of
markups with different measures of profitability indicates that higher markups do imply higher market power.
The elasticity of markup w.r.t. the profit margin oscillates around 0.15, i.e. 10% increase in the markup leads,
on average, to 1.5% increase in the profit margin. Inclusion of the quadratic term shows that relationship is not
monotonic and an increase in profit margins is slower for firms with very high markups. Control variables have
signs as expected where larger and more productive firms have also higher profitability.14
To provide a more detailed picture on the correlation between markups and profitability I also regress
markups on various cost items to find out whether movements in markups react to changes in firm costs. If
this is the case, and markups rise to compensate the increase in firm costs, then implied increase in markups
and profitability does not necessarily mean that firms exert market power. The results of these regressions are
presented in Table 4. By construction, the relation between the personnel costs in equation (6) and markups
should be negative. This is exactly what can be seen in the Column 1. The negative elasticity of labor input
reaches -0.29 and -0.38, respectively, indicating that 10% increase in the personnel costs implies 2.9% to 3.8%
decrease in the firm markup. In terms of intermediate consumption the coefficient is positive and significant
reaching 0.07 (column 2) and 0.17 in the specification with all cost items included (column 7). But this magnitude
is small and rise in costs of goods sold (excluding wages) affect markups only marginally. Other costs items
such as miscellaneous costs and depreciation are positively related to markups but the coefficients are again
very small and economically do not contribute much to movements in markups. In this case, 10% increase
in miscellaneous costs and depreciation leads to 0.1% and 0.2% increase in the markup, respectively. This is
a negligible contribution. I also regress firm markups on a change in firm net capital to investigate whether
firms compensate the change in net investments by increasing their markups. I find positive relation but the
coefficient is again very small (columns 6 and 7) thus ruling out the notion that markups rise in reaction to
rising costs. De Loecker et al. (2020) arrive to very similar conclusion. Although in their case, the elasticity
of SG&A costs w.r.t. markups is higher (0.56), nevertheless, it is still lower then unity. Other cost times such
14Results for the profit rate and the EBITDA margin are reported in the Appendix. The elasticity w.r.t the profit rate oscillates
around 0.2 and 0.14 w.r.t. the EBITDA margin.
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as advertising or R&D expenditure have elasticities very close to zero. These findings strengthen the fact that
the interplay between markups and profitability signals that firms exercise market power. Markups in Slovakia
evolve in excess of marginal costs as well.
Table 3: Value added markups and profit margin
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Profit margin Profit margin Profit margin
Markup 0.164*** 0.137*** 0.139***
(0.00805) (0.00785) (0.00705)
Markup sq. -0.0142*** -0.00975** -0.0125***
(0.00415) (0.00443) (0.00381)










Observations 361,128 187,967 240,313
R-squared 0.552 0.643 0.626
Firm FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.189 0.210 0.209
Adj. R-sq. 0.442 0.517 0.496
Legal form YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 4: Value added markups and costs development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Markup Markup Markup Markup Markup Markup Markup
Personnel costs -0.290*** -0.385***
(0.00908) (0.00916)








Net investment 0.003*** 0.0031***
(0.000517) (0.000684)
Constant 3.261*** -0.734*** -0.521*** -0.0269** 0.147*** 0.170*** 1.815***
(0.0968) (0.116) (0.154) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.00891) (0.235)
Observations 241,835 241,835 363,782 363,465 330,706 258,328 187,302
R-squared 0.749 0.731 0.680 0.683 0.690 0.721 0.789
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.0767 0.0104 0.00622 0.0142 0.00442 0.00385 0.116
Adj. R-sq. 0.662 0.638 0.602 0.605 0.609 0.648 0.715
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All variables in logs. Net investment calculated as log difference in net capital stock. Standard errors clustered by
NACE 3-digit sector.
To complete this section, I investigate whether a firm’s share of value added in its respective sector correlates
with its markup. Under standard oligopoly models a firm’s output share (in this case value added share) is a
sufficient statistic to calculate its markup. In these models higher output shares not only indicate higher markups
but also stronger market power. I follow Diéz et al. (2019) and regress firm markups on their sectoral value
added shares. Results are reported in Table 5. I do this separately for 3-digit and 4-digit sectors, respectively.
Using only market shares and not controlling for additional regressors I find a positive non-linear relationship
meaning that firms with higher market shares also have higher markups (Column 1). This result is an exact
opposite compared to Diéz et al. (2019). Adding more control variables drastically lowers the coefficient on
market share but the relationship still holds (Column 2). The same pattern holds when regressing markups on
market shares at 4-digit industry level.15 Only when taking logs of the market share the relationship between
markups and relative firm output size becomes insignificant but after the inclusion of control variables the
relationship recuperates its significance. The slight inconsistency of statistical significance of market shares at
more granular level is somehow unexpected. All in all, there is some empirical positive relation between market
power and markups but this relation depends very much on model specification. Thus I conclude that other firm
characteristics such as firm size (in terms of employment) are statistically better determinants of firm markups.
15Reported in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Value added sectoral shares and markups - NACE 3-digit level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NACE 3-digit NACE 3-digit NACE 3-digit NACE 3-digit
Market share 11.81*** 2.973***
(1.333) (0.715)




Employment sq. 0.0402*** 0.0487***
(0.00467) (0.00450)




log(Market share) 0.0520 0.158***
(0.0409) (0.0307)
log(Market share) sq. -0.0247*** -0.00271
(0.00240) (0.00221)
Observations 241,835 188,845 241,835 188,845
R-squared 0.732 0.908 0.826 0.912
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.0114 0.618 0.358 0.633
Adj. R-sq. 0.638 0.876 0.765 0.881
Legal form YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
6 Robustness checks
So far in the paper I have used value added and two-factor production function specification to calculate markups
and investigate the relation between markups, firm size and profitability. In this section I turn to alternative
calculation and use firm gross output (sales) and add intermediate consumption (material, energy and services)
to variable inputs to re-estimate the FOCs, markups and their relation to various firm characteristics. In
addition, I also turn my attention to the relation between labor share and markups.
6.1 Production function approach - gross output
One can plausibly argue that using value added to calculate markups does not measure firm’s market power at
the product market but rather constitutes a measure of monopsonistic power at the input (labor) market. Since
the only variable input in two-factor production function specification is labor, calculated markups measure
only a wedge between a firm’s price and marginal product of labor. Firm price setting policy may depend also
on the amount and price of purchased intermediate inputs and therefore it should be incorporated into the cost
minimization problem. Using the same optimization problem as in (3), but introducing a bundle of variable
inputs Vit, the problem can be analogically written as:
(12) Λ(Kit, Vit, λit) = qitVit + ritKi,t−1 − λit(F (·)− Yit),
where qit and rit denote input factor prices, Vit is the bundle of variable inputs (sum of personnel costs
and intermediate consumption). Then the minimization problem w.r.t. the variable input yields the markup
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such that:






where θVit stands for the output elasticity of the bundle of variable inputs. Another way of properly
exploiting the nature of three-factor production function is to include labor and materials separately. Using the
number of employees and intermediate consumption as inputs and sales as output, the problem can be written
as:
(14) Yit = Fit(Ait,Ki,t−1, Lit,Mit),
where Kit, Lit,Mit denote capital stock, labor and intermediate inputs, respectively. Variable inputs
Lit,Mit adjust perfectly while capital stock Kit faces adjustment frictions. In terms of cost minimization I
consider the Lagrangian objective function:
(15) Λ(Kit, Lit,Mit, λit) = witLit + ritKi,t−1 +mitMit − λit(F (·)− Yit),
where wit, rit,mit denote input factor prices. I assume that firms are price takers on input factor market.
The first order conditions with respect to the two variable inputs are:



































Substituting marginal cost for the markup to price ratio, I again obtain a simple expression for the firm
markup:













Since under this specification I have two markups, one for each variable input, I sum the output elasticities
and expenditures on variable inputs such that it is possible to derive one markup encompassing both Lit and
Mit:








In order to empirically derive firm markups, similarly as in the Subsection 3.2, one would need to estimate
the corresponding output elasticities. Contrary to the value added specification and Levinsohn-Petrin (2003)
approach used earlier in the paper, I now use the Olley & Pakes (1996) method to estimate the production
function using sales instead of value added. Since LP approach uses intermediate inputs as the proxy variable
which under the gross output specification constitute frictionless variable input, the OP method uses investment
as proxy instead and thus is more suitable for this type of estimation. Therefore the production function can
be written as:
(23) (PsitYsit) = θ3Capitalsi,t−1 + θ4Inputssit + τst + ωsit + εsit
or by replacing the input bundle Vit with number of employees and intermediate consumption, the produc-
tion function can be written as:
(24) (PsitYsit) = θ5Capitalsi,t−1 + θ6Laborsit + θ7InterConssit + τst + ωsit + εsit
where PsitYsit represents log of firm sales, Capitalsi,t−1 stands for log of sum of net fixed and intangible
assets from the previous year and Inputssit stands for log of variable inputs (sum of personnel costs and interme-
diate consumption). In the equation (24) Laborsit stands for log of number of employees and InterConssit for
log of intermediate consumption. Time dummies, productivity and the error term have the same representation
as in the equation (7). Subscripts s, i, t stand for sector, firm and year, respectively. Firm investment, the proxy
variable used in the OP estimation method is calculated as follows:
(25) Iit = Kit −Ki,t−1 + δKit,
where Iit represents investment of firm i in year t and δKit is capital depreciation. Capital stock and its
depreciation come directly from the data.
6.2 Evolution of the aggregate markup - gross output
This section reports on the evolution and distribution of markups estimated from the standard approach using
sales as a measure of firm output. I will always report and compare markups from both specifications, that
is from (13) and (22). Compared to Figure 1 there is a clear level shift in the size of the aggregate markup.
Markups estimated this way are on average 50 percent smaller and range from 1.08 to 1.15, depending on the
specification. Although they also experience declining tendency over the period in question, they are largely
stable and their decline is marginal. Both sales markups declined by less than 1 percent between 2012 to 2018
(Figure 9, blue lines). For comparison, the aggregate value added markup declined by 25% over the same period.
Looking at the covariance between relative firm output size and markups, one can see that the results differ
depending on the markup specification. In Figure 9, similarly as in the baseline value added case, the markup
calculated using the bundle of variable inputs from (13) displays the same properties. The aggregate weighted
markup (blue dashed line) is always above the average markup (grey dashed line) showing that relatively larger
firms (in terms of sales) have higher markups. The story changes when using the second specification in (22)
where markups are calculated from the 3-factor production function. Here, starting from 2015, the covariance
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between markups and firm sales share becomes negative implying that on average firms with smaller sales have
higher markups (black solid line is above the blue solid line).
Figure 9: Aggregate markup - sales
Note: The weighted average markups equal the sales-share-weighted average of firm level markups for each PF specifi-
cation. Simple average is calculated as an arithmetic mean of individual firm markups. Solid lines represent markups
calculated according to equation (22). Dashed lines use markups from equation (13).
Figure 10: Sectoral markups - sales
Note: Sectoral markup equals the sales-share-weighted average of firm level markups. Weights are calculated as a ratio
of firm sales in total sector sales. Markups according to equation (13) - left panel. Markups from equation (22) - right
panel.
From the sectoral perspective the evolution of markups largely stays the same, where again, highest markups
can be found in services and utilities (Figure 10). The only exception is mining sector, which under the two
alternative PF specifications experiences high and increasing industry markup. It is no surprise that mining,
utilities and services have relatively high markups. In case of the mining sector, mining probably owes its high
markups mainly to concentration, geographic factors and regulation. Coal reserves are concentrated in specific
areas thus limiting competition and domestic mining industry is heavily subsidized through price regulation. For
utilities, although the gas and electricity market is fully liberalized, the sector as a whole experiences relatively
high level of markups as well, partly thanks to the network nature of the industry. The story for services
may not be so straight, but again, high markup firms in ICT, casinos, telecommunication sectors and spatial
non-tradability of services together with the prevalence of smaller of firms (in terms of number of employees)
might contribute to relatively high markups in this sector.
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Figure 11: Aggregate weighted vs. mean sectoral markups - sales
Note: Mean sectoral markups calculated as a simple unweighted average of sectoral markups. Markups according to
equation (13) - left panel. Markups from equation (22) - right panel.
Figure 12: Evolution of markups by quartiles - equation (13)
Note: Markups calculated as a weighted average of firm level markups in each quartile. Left panel (quartiles by sales),
right panel (quartiles by markup). Markups according to equation (13).
Using the decomposition from (9) and seeing the evolution of markups in Figures 11, 12 and 13 show how
more detailed analysis of markups may change the results depending on the production function specification.
In the baseline value added case, the weighted aggregate markup was always larger than mean markups (firm
as well as sectoral) implying that firms with greater value added have also higher markups. Sales markups
calculated from (13) and (22) do not display such properties (Figure 11). Looking at the arithmetic mean of
markups at NACE 3-digit level, it is clear to see that in both alternative specifications smaller sectors have
higher markups (black line is above the blue line) which is contrary to the baseline results presented in Figure
3 from the previous section. That is, both Diéz et al. (2019) and De Loecker et al. (2020) are correct in a sense
that their claims about the relation between markups and relative output sizes seem to depend on the choice of
variables and production function specification.
The sales quartile distribution also displays differing properties. While in the baseline case the relatively
largest firms (in terms of value added) experienced significant decline in markups starting from 2014, sales
markups are on average stable over this period (left panels, Figures 12 and 13). Also it is not the firms from
the 4th quartile that have the highest markups but the firms around the median sales from 2nd and 3rd sales
quartile see relatively higher and increasing markups.
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Figure 13: Evolution of markups by quartiles - equation (22)
Note: Markups calculated as a weighted average of firm level markups in each quartile. Left panel (quartiles by sales),
right panel (quartiles by markup). Markups according to equation (22).
Figure 14: Kernel density distribution of firm markups - equation (22)
Note: Density distribution looks very similar for both alternative markup specifications, thus for the sake of simplicity I
report only one. Left panel = year 2018.
Density distributions and markup change decomposititons are in line with the value added baseline case.
Smaller firms (less than 50 employees) have markups more dispersed and outliers present on both sides of the
distribution meanwhile the overall distribution changes very slightly between 2010 and 2018. Identically as
in the baseline value added case, the change in the aggregate markup is driven mainly by the within sector
component (Figures 15 and 16).
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Figure 15: Change in aggregate markup, firm-level decomposition - equation (13)
Note: Change decomposition is very similar for both alternative markup specifications, thus for the sake of simplicity I
report only one.
Figure 16: Change in aggregate markup, sectoral decomposition - equation (13)
Note: Change decomposition is very similar for both alternative markup specifications, thus for the sake of simplicity I
report only one.
In sum, robustness checks in most cases verify the results from the value added specification. Aggregate
markup declined, markups are high in utilities and services and their distribution does not change very much
over time. It seems again that smaller firms (in terms of number of employees) have higher markups and the
decline in the aggregate markup is indeed driven by the within firm and sectoral component. On the other
hand, some more detailed features of the markup distribution differ and it seems like the choice of inputs and
production function specification may affect the additional results to some extent.
6.3 Markups, firm size and labor share - gross output
As for further robustness checks I will re-estimate the regressions from Section 5 using sales markups from
definitions (13) and (22). I will also investigate whether markups are negatively related to labor shares as in
De Loecker et al. (2020). Table 6 provides results on the relation between firm size and markups. I again find
inverse relationship but the magnitude of the effect is significantly lower compared to the value added case. In
the baseline results I have found that 1% increase in the firm employment leads to 0.26% to 0.5% decline in the
markup whereas in the case with sales markups the elasticity oscillates around 0 with statistically significant
negative elasticity around -0.03. Quantitatively this suggests that 1% increase in firm employment leads to only
0.03% decline in the firm markup which is an economically negligible effect. Signs of the coefficients on control
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variables are in line with the baseline results where again, given all other variables constant, more productive
firms have on average higher markups.
Table 6: Sales markups and firm size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Employment -0.0274** -0.00115 -0.0253*** -0.0282** -0.00879 -0.0257***
(0.0108) (0.00523) (0.00614) (0.0110) (0.00835) (0.00625)
Employment sq. 0.00660*** -0.000810 0.00378*** 0.00705*** 0.00402** 0.00417***
(0.00171) (0.00107) (0.000931) (0.00177) (0.00163) (0.000967)
Capital intensity 0.00103*** -0.000779* 0.00273*** -0.000786*
(0.000236) (0.000405) (0.000394) (0.000407)
TFP 0.792*** 0.251***
(0.0412) (0.0201)
Labor productivity 0.121*** 0.121***
(0.00628) (0.00628)
Constant 0.0567*** -0.0555*** -0.961*** 0.107*** -0.637*** -0.908***
(0.0139) (0.00718) (0.0674) (0.0140) (0.0653) (0.0688)
Observations 268,249 214,962 244,780 268,249 214,960 244,780
R-squared 0.688 0.936 0.780 0.721 0.809 0.815
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.0005 0.774 0.302 0.0006 0.236 0.301
Adj. R-sq. 0.581 0.914 0.703 0.626 0.743 0.751
Legal form YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
In their paper, De Loecker et al. (2020) discus some macroeconomic implications of rising markups including
the evolution of labor shares (aggregate labor compensations as a share of GDP). It is now a well known fact that
in the last three decades we have seen a steady decline in labor shares across the developed world.16 Economic
researchers are therefore trying to provide an explanation for this phenomenon. There are many candidates but
not one of them provide a single comprehensive answer. For example Karabarbounis & Neiman (2013) state
that the decrease in relative price of investment leads to the substitution of capital for labor thus decreasing
labor’s share in output. This proposition relies on the fact that the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor must be higher than 1. Karabarbounis & Neiman (2013) do find that the elasticity is higher than 1
but many other studies find opposite results.17
Some other studies such as Koh et al. (2014) stress the fact that growing importance of intangible capital
pushed firms to invest more thus spending less on labor. De Loecker et al. (2020) dismiss this explanation since
under perfect competition rise in intangible investment should not lead to rise in market power (profit rate).
From the institutional point view the usual suspect in the literature for the decline of labor share is declining
union membership. For example Fichtenbaum (2011) finds that the decline in unionization in the U.S. from
1997 to 2006 explains about 29 percent of the decline in labor’s share of income. But on the other hand, Elsby
et al. (2013) find little support for capital-labor substitution, nor for the role of a decline in unionization. They,
however, do find some support for offshoring labor-intensive work as a potential explanation 18
De Loecker et al. (2020) build on first order conditions from the cost minimization problem estimation
16See for example Autor et al. (2020).
17See De Loecker et al. (2020).
18See De Loecker et al. (2020).
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and try to explain the decrease in the labor share by the rise in markups and market power. They relate their
firm level estimates with macro developments and show that due to reallocation of economic activity toward
high-markup firms, the negative effect of markups on the labor share in aggregate is predominantly driven by
few large firms with high markups and low firm labor shares.
As for Slovakia, recent years have seen a strong labor market dynamism with wages and employment rising
steadily since 2014. Between 2014 and 2019 GDP grew around 3% on average, employment around 2% and
nominal wages by 5% with cumulative growth of 32%. There were no talks or any major developments regard-
ing declining union membership. Intangible investment (proxy for R&D investment) is low for international
standards and is not crowding-out resources for labor compensation. Through the lens of international trade
literature, Slovakia is more likely to be a destination country for off-shoring rather than being a country that
off-shores. These developments together with decreasing markups and strong labor market in the recent years
should indicate an increase in the labor share, and in fact, macroeconomic data supports these developments.
Aggregate labor share rose from 37% in 2013 to almost 43% in 2019 meanwhile the aggregate markup declined
(Figure 17).19
Figure 17: Aggregate labor share and markup
Note: Source Eurostat.
Figure 17 reports only a suggestive evidence of the negative relation between markups and labor share.
Therefore I turn to firm level analysis and empirically estimate regressions with labor share as the dependent
variable to verify the conclusions of De Loecker et al. (2020). I use the share of personnel costs in sales as well as
in value added. Results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The results indeed document the inverse relationship
between firm markups and labor’s share of income. When looking at the share of personnel costs in sales (Table
7), the estimated elasticity of labor share w.r.t. the firm markup moves around 1, that is, 1% increase in the
firm markup leads to 1% decrease in the firm labor share on average. The elasticity of labor’s share in value
added w.r.t. the firm markup is also statistically significant and ranges from -1.2 to -2.8, depending on the
specification. It is interesting that TFP and labor productivity are negatively related to the labor share (Table
8). This additional result is consistent with past research which points to the fact that more productive firms
in Slovakia have lower labor shares.20 It is also consistent with the superstar hypothesis of Autor et al. (2020).
Combining these results with the change decompositions from earlier sections it is clear to see that the rise
in the aggregate labor share must be a within firm/sectoral phenomenon since the decrease in the aggregate
markup was widespread and happened across the entire economy.
19It is more suitable to report the markup estimated from the value added specification since GDP is a sum value added.
20Vyskrabka (2018)
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Table 7: Sales markups and labor share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Markup -1.071*** -0.876*** -1.123*** -1.084*** -1.058*** -1.175***
(0.0186) (0.0522) (0.0498) (0.0174) (0.0251) (0.0566)
Markup sq. 0.147*** 0.206*** 0.523*** 0.148*** 0.201*** 0.477***
(0.0267) (0.0348) (0.0640) (0.0279) (0.0363) (0.0643)
Capital intensity -0.0112*** -0.0116*** -0.0114*** -0.0117***
(0.00136) (0.00132) (0.00133) (0.00131)
TFP -0.132*** 0.0356**
(0.0463) (0.0154)
Employment 0.714*** 0.793*** 0.718*** 0.793***
(0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0280)
Employment sq. -0.0619*** -0.0731*** -0.0622*** -0.0729***
(0.00472) (0.00477) (0.00473) (0.00477)
Labor productivity -0.00875 -0.00911
(0.0152) (0.0153)
Constant -1.901*** -2.961*** -2.966*** -1.848*** -3.025*** -2.901***
(0.00867) (0.125) (0.175) (0.00893) (0.131) (0.172)
Observations 404,121 214,423 244,016 404,121 214,423 244,016
R-squared 0.856 0.915 0.901 0.855 0.915 0.901
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.180 0.239 0.209 0.179 0.238 0.208
Adj. R-sq. 0.821 0.886 0.866 0.820 0.885 0.866
Legal form YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 8: Sales markups and labor share in value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Markup -2.775*** -2.616*** -1.193*** -2.796*** -2.811*** -1.192***
(0.117) (0.137) (0.0669) (0.114) (0.144) (0.0717)
Markup sq. 0.178* 0.324** 0.0147 0.240** 0.399*** 0.0457
(0.0952) (0.140) (0.0512) (0.0991) (0.147) (0.0553)
Capital intensity -0.00831*** 0.0103*** -0.00827*** 0.0103***
(0.00137) (0.000987) (0.00133) (0.000995)
TFP -0.205*** -0.0565***
(0.0199) (0.0115)
Employment 0.324*** 0.252*** 0.326*** 0.253***
(0.0228) (0.0268) (0.0228) (0.0268)
Employment sq. -0.0352*** -0.0296*** -0.0355*** -0.0292***
(0.00363) (0.00403) (0.00362) (0.00406)
Labor productivity -0.644*** -0.645***
(0.0161) (0.0164)
Constant -0.220*** -0.460* 5.209*** -0.0810*** -0.179 5.277***
(0.0107) (0.249) (0.213) (0.0143) (0.259) (0.215)
Observations 367,537 198,899 243,956 367,537 198,899 243,956
R-squared 0.777 0.831 0.909 0.776 0.830 0.909
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.415 0.436 0.718 0.413 0.435 0.717
Adj. R-sq. 0.722 0.771 0.877 0.721 0.771 0.877
Legal form YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
6.4 Markups, profitability and market power - gross output
In this brief section I verify whether the alternative markup specifications also support the conclusion regarding
the positive relation between markups and profitability. As usual, I will re-estimate the regressions from Section
5.3 using sales markups from definitions (13) and (22). I start with profitability with the results reported in
Table 9. Following results largely support the previous findings. Sales markups are strongly related to all
measures of profitability but their effect on profit margin is five times stronger compared to the value added
specification. The elasticity of profit margin w.r.t. sales markups reaches 0.8 whereas in the value added case
the elasticity is around 0.15.21 In addition, control variables behave as expected.
21The results from profit rate as well as for EBITDA margin are reported in the Appendix.
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Table 9: Sales markups and profit margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Markup 0.779*** 0.757*** 0.761*** 0.780*** 0.819*** 0.789***
(0.0484) (0.0462) (0.0439) (0.0512) (0.0594) (0.0524)
Markup sq. -0.0413 -0.0798 -0.371*** -0.0409 -0.0728 -0.320***
(0.0321) (0.113) (0.0576) (0.0334) (0.111) (0.0583)
Capital intensity -0.00427*** -0.00507*** -0.00426*** -0.00503***
(0.000664) (0.000439) (0.000658) (0.000428)
TFP 0.0661*** 0.00730**
(0.00756) (0.00352)
Employment 0.0248** 0.0259*** 0.0243** 0.0258***
(0.00953) (0.00632) (0.00959) (0.00625)
Employment sq. -0.00234 -0.00227** -0.00224 -0.00240**
(0.00160) (0.00110) (0.00161) (0.00110)
Labor productivity 0.0341*** 0.0345***
(0.00384) (0.00400)
Constant -0.0608*** -0.0987** -0.366*** -0.0996*** -0.155*** -0.412***
(0.00399) (0.0447) (0.0494) (0.00577) (0.0479) (0.0504)
Observations 401,974 211,483 243,201 401,974 211,483 243,201
R-squared 0.569 0.653 0.667 0.568 0.652 0.665
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.210 0.230 0.309 0.209 0.229 0.305
Adj. R-sq. 0.463 0.532 0.551 0.463 0.531 0.548
Legal form YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
Another interesting finding is that sales markups react to changes in costs only very weakly. The results are
presented in Table 10.22 The elasticity of various cost times is indeed positive and statistically significant but
the magnitude of the effect is virtually zero. High markups do not compensate for the rise in costs. Compared to
the value added specification, on one hand, sales markup are strongly related to profitability, but on the other,
they do not reflect movements in costs. For the most part, markups evolve in excess of marginal costs and are
strongly correlated with profitability. These findings suggest that movements in markups indeed imply changes
in market power. In the Appendix I report regressions of sales markups on firm sales shares in their respective
NACE 3-digit and 4-digit sectors. I again find inconsistent results and statistically unconvincing findings. In
specifications with control variables market share loses significance and in logarithmic specifications the market
share variable changes sign.
22Regression results using markup from definition (22) reported in the Appendix. The results remain robust and strengthen the
fact that sales markups do not react to changes in costs.
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Table 10: Sales markups and costs developments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle
Personnel costs -0.00633*** -0.0129***
(0.00133) (0.00158)








Net investment 0.00147*** 0.00124***
(0.000167) (0.000215)
Constant 0.108*** -0.0674* -0.0268 -0.0188*** 0.0361*** 0.0426*** 0.0964*
(0.0137) (0.0377) (0.0500) (0.00398) (0.00366) (0.00241) (0.0568)
Observations 412,658 412,658 412,658 412,270 372,226 298,832 213,248
R-squared 0.628 0.628 0.628 0.631 0.638 0.667 0.720
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.00261 0.00249 0.00185 0.00908 0.00222 0.00187 0.0107
Adj. R-sq. 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.540 0.544 0.580 0.623
Legal form YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All variables in logs. Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have empirically evaluated the evolution of markups in Slovakia using the production function
approach recently popularized by De Loecker et al. (2020). I have found empirical regularities which are
consistent with the contemporary markup literature. I showed that the aggregate markup in Slovakia decreased
over the past years and the decrease came mainly from the utility and service sector. Markups tend to be higher
for relatively larger firms and they are also higher in larger sectors (in terms of value added). Smaller firms (size
indicated by number of employees) tend to have higher markups, but there are some large firms with higher
markups that drive the evolution of aggregate markup. In Autor et al. (2020)) the authors find that larger
and more productive firms have higher markups. In Slovak data it is smaller but more productive firms that
display such property. Markup decompositions show that at the firm level the within effect is the main driver
of aggregate markup movements and the change in markups occurs within and between sectors at the same
time. The data further implies that markups are indeed a suitable measure for market power since the rise in
markups is in excess of costs and markups are highly correlated with profitability. Robustness checks largely
validate the baseline results but in some areas results might depend on the choice of inputs and production
function specification.
There are many other areas that are especially interesting for the market power research but were beyond the
scope of this study. For example, further research could analyse cross-country differences in aggregate markups
and labor shares at the macro level and shed more on light on true macroeconomic impact of rising/decreasing
market power. However, this approach requires rich and detailed firm level data which must be internationally
comparable in order to calculate consistent markups across countries. Another fruitful area might be to evaluate
the effect of international trade on firm markups and set up a model of a small open economy to carry out
various counterfactual policy relevant analyses. Last but no least, the exogeneity of markups in relation to firm
optimizing behaviour is not properly studied therefore rewards thorough attention.
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Diéz, F. J., Leigh, D. & Tambunlertchai, S. (2018), Global market power and its macroeconomic implications,
Working Paper 18/137, International Monetary Fund.
URL: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/15/Global-Market-Power-and-its-
Macroeconomic-Implications-45975
Dobbelaere, S., Kiyota, K. & Mairesse, J. (2013), Product and labor market imperfections and scale economies:
Micro-evidence on france, japan and the netherlands, Working Paper 19059, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19059
Elsby, M., Hobijn, B. & Sahin, A. (2013), ‘The decline of the u.s. labor share’, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 44(2 (Fall)), 1–63.
URL: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:44:y:2013:i:2013-02:p:1-63
Fichtenbaum, R. (2011), ‘Do unions affect labor’s share of income: Evidence using panel data’, American
Journal of Economics and Sociology 70(3), 784–810.
URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2011.00792.x
Hall, R. E. (1988), ‘The relation between price and marginal cost in u.s. industry’, Journal of Political Economy
96(5), 921–947.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/261570
Holmes, T. J. & Stevens, J. J. (2014), ‘An alternative theory of the plant size distribution, with geography and
intra- and international trade’, Journal of Political Economy 122(2), 369–421.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/674633
31
Hsieh, C.-T. & Klenow, P. J. (2009), ‘Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India*’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 124(4), 1403–1448.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1403
Jarosch, G., Nimczik, J. S. & Sorkin, I. (2019), Granular search, market structure, and wages, Working Paper
26239, National Bureau of Economic Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w26239
Karabarbounis, L. & Neiman, B. (2013), ‘The Global Decline of the Labor Share*’, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 129(1), 61–103.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt032
Koh, D., Santaeulalia-Llopis, R. & Zheng, Y. (2014), ‘Labor share decline and the capitalization of intellectual
property products’, SSRN Electronic Journal .
Levinsohn, J. & Petrin, A. (2003), ‘Estimating production functions using inputs to control for unobservables’,
Review of Economic Studies 70(2), 317–341.
URL: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:317-341
McAdam, P., Petroulakis, F., Vansteenkiste, I., Cavalleri, M. C., Eliet, A. & Soares, A. (2019), ‘Concentration,
market power and dynamism in the euro area’, ECB Discussion Papers (2253).
URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/research/discussion-papers/html/index.en.html
Mollisi, V. & Rovigatti, G. (2017), Theory and Practice of TFP Estimation: the Control Function Approach
Using Stata, CEIS Research Paper 399, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/rtv/ceisrp/399.html
Olley, G. S. & Pakes, A. (1996), ‘The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications equipment industry’,
Econometrica 64(6), 1263–1297.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2171831
Petrin, A., Poi, B. & Levinsohn, J. (2004), ‘Production function estimation in stata using inputs to control for
unobservables’, Stata Journal 4(2), 113–123.
URL: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tsj:stataj:v:4:y:2004:i:2:p:113-123
Qiu, Y. & Sojourner, A. J. (2019), ‘Labor-Market Concentration and Labor Compensation’.
URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312197





Table 11: Value added markups and profit rate
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Profit rate Profit rate Profit rate
Markup 0.222*** 0.197*** 0.196***
(0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0121)
Markup sq. -0.0166** -0.0118 -0.0159**
(0.00779) (0.00796) (0.00748)










Observations 353,760 186,204 237,661
R-squared 0.519 0.590 0.578
Firm FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.177 0.182 0.185
Adj. R-sq. 0.400 0.446 0.430
R-sq. 0.519
Legal form YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 12: Value added markups and EBITDA margin
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES EBITDA margin EBITDA margin EBITDA margin
Markup 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.143***
(0.00767) (0.00771) (0.00701)
Markup sq. -0.0131*** -0.0105** -0.0128***
(0.00474) (0.00467) (0.00421)










Observations 325,454 188,097 240,567
R-squared 0.626 0.707 0.683
Firm FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.250 0.281 0.271
Adj. R-sq. 0.528 0.604 0.572
Legal form YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 13: Value added sectoral shares and markups - NACE 4-digit level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NACE 4-digit NACE 4-digit NACE 4-digit NACE 4-digit
Market share 5.868*** 0.762***
(0.402) (0.235)




Employment sq. 0.0429*** 0.0490***
(0.00437) (0.00450)




log(Market share) 0.0473 0.0665***
(0.0317) (0.0213)
log(Market share) sq. -0.0243*** -0.00335*
(0.00265) (0.00185)
Observations 241,835 188,845 241,835 188,845
R-squared 0.732 0.908 0.816 0.910
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.0129 0.617 0.323 0.625
Adj. R-sq. 0.639 0.876 0.752 0.879
Legal form YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Standard errors clustered by NACE 4-digit sector.
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Table 14: Sales markups and profit rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Markup 0.647*** 0.700*** 0.644*** 0.640*** 0.736*** 0.653***
(0.0424) (0.0409) (0.0445) (0.0402) (0.0448) (0.0511)
Markup sq. 0.0335 0.163*** -0.127** 0.0318 0.148*** -0.115**
(0.0538) (0.0385) (0.0507) (0.0513) (0.0420) (0.0525)
Capital intensity -0.00721*** -0.00957*** -0.00718*** -0.00956***
(0.000824) (0.000693) (0.000825) (0.000688)
TFP 0.0623*** -0.000150
(0.00909) (0.00334)
Employment -0.0200 0.000892 -0.0208* 0.000900
(0.0124) (0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0107)
Employment sq. 0.00325 0.00113 0.00332* 0.000959
(0.00202) (0.00168) (0.00201) (0.00166)
Labor productivity 0.0786*** 0.0790***
(0.00413) (0.00415)
Constant -0.0387*** 0.00844 -0.691*** -0.0711*** -0.0217 -0.729***
(0.00618) (0.0490) (0.0572) (0.00780) (0.0519) (0.0582)
Observations 391,640 207,801 240,005 391,640 207,801 240,005
R-squared 0.499 0.576 0.577 0.499 0.575 0.576
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.131 0.141 0.187 0.130 0.140 0.186
Adj. R-sq. 0.376 0.428 0.428 0.376 0.428 0.428
Legal form YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 15: Sales markups and EBITDA margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Markup 0.856*** 0.817*** 0.779*** 0.860*** 0.883*** 0.805***
(0.0609) (0.0555) (0.0499) (0.0655) (0.0737) (0.0608)
Markup sq. -0.0707* -0.126 -0.373*** -0.0666 -0.103 -0.314***
(0.0403) (0.170) (0.0735) (0.0425) (0.160) (0.0725)
Capital intensity 0.000755 -0.000232 0.000764 -0.000200
(0.000480) (0.000216) (0.000470) (0.000221)
TFP 0.0640*** 0.00588*
(0.00633) (0.00334)
Employment 0.0335*** 0.0220*** 0.0332*** 0.0219***
(0.00944) (0.00543) (0.00943) (0.00539)
Employment sq. -0.00295** -0.00197* -0.00287** -0.00209**
(0.00129) (0.00100) (0.00131) (0.00101)
Labor productivity 0.0260*** 0.0266***
(0.00435) (0.00454)
Constant 0.00148 -0.138* -0.321*** -0.0408*** -0.194** -0.369***
(0.00519) (0.0764) (0.0840) (0.00771) (0.0789) (0.0853)
Observations 360,383 212,088 243,489 360,383 212,088 243,489
R-squared 0.649 0.713 0.744 0.649 0.712 0.741
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.302 0.324 0.428 0.300 0.321 0.421
Adj. R-sq. 0.557 0.614 0.655 0.557 0.612 0.651
Legal form YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Capital intensity measured as a ratio of capital stock to employment. TFP estimated from the corresponding
production function. Labor productivity measured as a ratio of valued added to employment. All variables in logs.
Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 16: Sales markups and costs developments - markup definition (22)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Personnel costs -0.00625*** -0.0127***
(0.00132) (0.00157)








Net investment 0.00151*** 0.00124***
(0.000166) (0.000215)
Constant 0.158*** -0.0176 0.0217 0.0315*** 0.0861*** 0.0914*** 0.149**
(0.0138) (0.0380) (0.0503) (0.00391) (0.00371) (0.00235) (0.0578)
Observations 412,658 412,658 412,658 412,270 372,226 298,832 213,248
R-squared 0.663 0.663 0.662 0.665 0.674 0.703 0.753
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.00258 0.00250 0.00186 0.00914 0.00224 0.00188 0.0106
Adj. R-sq. 0.580 0.580 0.580 0.584 0.589 0.625 0.668
Legal form YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All variables in logs. Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 17: Sales markups and market share - NACE 3-digit level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Market share 1.889*** 0.141 2.035*** 0.212
(0.257) (0.294) (0.275) (0.326)
Market share sq. -2.440*** -0.186 -2.611*** -0.354
(0.503) (0.371) (0.534) (0.422)
Employment -0.000565 -0.0262*** -0.00804 -0.0981***
(0.00545) (0.00803) (0.00855) (0.00940)
Employment sq. -0.000983 0.00172 0.00379** 0.0127***
(0.00111) (0.00144) (0.00171) (0.00185)
Capital intensity 0.00103*** 0.000483** 0.00272*** 0.000786*
(0.000233) (0.000194) (0.000394) (0.000443)
TFP 0.792*** 0.772*** 0.251*** 0.213***
(0.0413) (0.0465) (0.0202) (0.0176)
log(Market share) -0.0655*** -0.0292** -0.0583*** -0.104***
(0.0185) (0.0138) (0.0190) (0.0207)
log(Market share) sq. -0.00988*** -0.00299*** -0.00956*** -0.0106***
(0.00133) (0.000865) (0.00135) (0.00127)
Constant 0.0297*** -0.0561*** 0.176** -0.0466 0.0804*** -0.662*** 0.263*** -0.507***
(0.00149) (0.00728) (0.0723) (0.0798) (0.00152) (0.0626) (0.0746) (0.119)
Observations 268,249 214,962 268,249 214,962 268,249 214,962 268,249 214,960
R-squared 0.688 0.936 0.723 0.937 0.722 0.809 0.753 0.820
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.00186 0.774 0.113 0.777 0.00212 0.236 0.115 0.281
Adj. R-sq. 0.582 0.914 0.628 0.915 0.626 0.743 0.669 0.758
Legal form YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Standard errors clustered by NACE 3-digit sector.
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Table 18: Sales markups and market share - NACE 4-digit level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle VC bundle 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor 3-factor
Market share 0.993*** 0.122 1.010*** 0.0983
(0.103) (0.121) (0.106) (0.123)
Market share sq. -0.981*** -0.143 -0.998*** -0.125
(0.111) (0.123) (0.113) (0.125)
Employment -0.000457 -0.0237*** -0.00832 -0.0840***
(0.00488) (0.00704) (0.00833) (0.0103)
Employment sq. -0.00104 0.000875 0.00385** 0.0106***
(0.00102) (0.00115) (0.00162) (0.00169)
Capital intensity 0.00102*** 0.000467*** 0.00272*** 0.000977**
(0.000212) (0.000168) (0.000380) (0.000423)
TFP 0.791*** 0.773*** 0.251*** 0.220***
(0.0374) (0.0411) (0.0171) (0.0149)
log(Market share) -0.0430*** -0.00994 -0.0413** -0.0658***
(0.0159) (0.00845) (0.0162) (0.0156)
log(Market share) sq. -0.00862*** -0.00207*** -0.00854*** -0.00860***
(0.00142) (0.000587) (0.00143) (0.00132)
Constant 0.0285*** -0.0818*** 0.210*** 0.0295 0.0795*** -0.636*** 0.269*** -0.441***
(0.00135) (0.0207) (0.0462) (0.0566) (0.00137) (0.0629) (0.0475) (0.0757)
Observations 268,249 214,960 268,249 214,962 268,249 214,960 268,249 214,962
R-squared 0.688 0.936 0.719 0.937 0.722 0.809 0.749 0.820
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. within 0.00222 0.774 0.101 0.778 0.00229 0.236 0.101 0.278
Adj. R-sq. 0.582 0.914 0.623 0.915 0.626 0.743 0.663 0.757
Legal form YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Standard errors clustered by NACE 4-digit sector.
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